Listening to someone from some distance in a crowded room you may experience the following phenomenon: when looking at them speak, you may both hear and see where the source of the sounds is; but when your eyes are turned elsewhere, you may no longer be able to detect exactly where the voice must be coming from. With your eyes again fixed on the speaker, and the movement of her lips a clear sense of the source of the sound will (...) return. This ‘ventriloquist’ effect reflects the ways in which visual cognition can dominate auditory perception. And this phenomenological observation is one what you can verify or disconfirm in your own case just by the slightest reflection on what it is like for you to listen to someone with or without visual contact with them. (shrink)

It is usual to read nomina, with which three interpretations are possible. The stronger arrogates to himself the titles of moderation and justice. So in the excellent Rumanian translation of 1871 by Gavrilu J. Munteanu: ‘Cându are sâ decida pumnulu, celu mai tare si atribue titlu de moderatu şi de onestu.’.

In his, A Critical History of Greek Philosophy, W. T. Stace denies to give Indian schools of thought a philosophical status. He gives three reasons for that—(1) Indian thoughts have practical motivation, (2) instead of rational explanation, it is content with symbolism, and (3) India lies outside the mainstream human civilization. In the defense of Indian philosophy, these three arguments have been countered in this paper from different perspectives. It has been shown that these arguments are rooted in scientism, extreme (...) idealism, and ethnocentrism respectively. Stace has also argued that philosophy has four leading traits—(1) discussing the universe as a whole, (2) generalizing sciences, (3) idealism, and (4) non-practical motivation. For a proper defense, it has been shown that Indian systems share those traits. At the end, a conclusive remark has been given. It has been remarked that Stace’s case is an example of ethnocentric bias and racism. It has also been suggested that the interaction of the philosophies of different civilizations is necessary for the very sake of philosophy. Though this is not the first endeavor to defend Indian philosophy, the literature review (conducted by the author) suggests that Stace’s arguments haven’t been criticized separately. Philosophy and Progress, Vol#73-74; No#1-2; Jan-Dec 2023 P 281-314. (shrink)

The debate about constructivism in physics has led to different kinds of questions that can be conventionally framed in two classes. One concerns the mathematics that is considered for the theoretical development of physics. The other is concerned with the experimental parts of physical theories. It is unnecessary to observe that the intersection between our two classes of problems is far from being empty. In this paper we will mainly deal with topics belonging to the second class. However, let us (...) briefly mention some important problems that have been debated in the framework of our first class. For instance, the following: to what extent do the undecidability and incompleteness results of classical mathematics affect fragments of physical theories, in such way as to have a “real physical meaning”? are the mathematical arguments that seem to be essential for physics justifiable in the framework of traditional mathematical constructivism?The first question has recently been investigated by Pitowski, Penrose, da Costa, Doria, Mundici, Svozil and others. As expected by most logicians, one can construct undecidable sentences whose physical meaning seems to be hardly questionable. This happens both in classical and in quantum mechanics. (shrink)

A long-standing theme in discussion of perception and thought has been that our primary cognitive contact with individual objects and events in the world derives from our perceptual contact with them. When I look at a duck in front of me, I am not merely presented with the fact that there is at least one duck in the area, rather I seem to be presented withthisthing (as one might put it from my perspective) in front of me, which looks to (...) me to be a duck. Furthermore, such a perception would seem to put me in a position not merely to make the existential judgment that there is some duck or other present, but rather to make a singular, demonstrative judgment, that that is a duck. My grounds for an existential judgment in this case derives from my apprehension of the demonstrative thought and not vice versa. (shrink)

(1985). Teacher education since 1944: Providing the teachers and controlling the providers. British Journal of Educational Studies: Vol. 33, No. 2, pp. 164-172.

Anecdotal reports obtained from three individuals with prosopagnosia, all of whom have participated in an investigation, capture the essence of their impairment. This article focuses on the contrast between two prominent forms of prosopagnosia, one of which results from an acquired brain insult in an otherwise premorbidly normal individual and a second which appears to be lifelong and occurs in the absence of any obvious brain damage, at least as evident on conventional brain imaging. It reviews two central issues: the (...) first concerns the similarities and differences in the psychological representations of faces in acquired prosopagnosia and congenital prosopagnosia, and the second concerns the nature of the underlying neural representations of faces in these two populations. Some well-established overlapping behavioral characteristics are identified. (shrink)

Following Fine [3], p. 20, we say that a normal propositional modal logic is canonical i all its theorems are valid on the frame of its canonical model . In this paper we prove that K1:1, i.e. S4+ J1 L p) p is not canonical y . We say that two points x and y in a frame are co-accessible i xRy; yRx, but x =6 y. Our proof proceeds by showing that A. The canonical model for K1:1 contains a (...) pair of co-accessible points; and B. J1 is not valid on any frame with a pair of co-accessible points. Clearly our result follows immediately from A and B. (shrink)